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Summary Table 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.2 -0.8 1.1 2.0 2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure -2.1 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 
Investment 5.0 -2.4 11.3 12.5 9.2 
Exports 4.7 1.1 12.6 5.1 4.5 
Imports 6.9 0.6 13.2 4.4 4.6 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -0.3 0.2 4.8 4.4 3.7 
Gross National Product (GNP) 1.1 3.3 5.2 4.1 3.5 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 0.9 2.4 0.0 1.0 1.0 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Labour Market 
    
 
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,843 1,880 1,914 1,964 2,019 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 316 282 243 211 185 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 14.7 13.1 11.3 9.7 8.4 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Public Finance 
    
 
General Government Balance (€ bn) -13.9 -10.0 -6.8 -4.5 -0.6 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -8.0 -5.7 -3.7 -2.3 -0.3 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 121.7 123.3 109.6 106.5 101.3 
 
    
 
  
    
 
External Trade 
    
 
Balance of Payments Current Account (€ bn) 1.5 6.6 10.5 13.4 15.2 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.0 4.5 6.6 7.9 8.5 
 
    
 
 
    
 
Demand 
    
 
Final Demand 2.4 0.5 8.8 4.4 4.1 
Domestic Demand -0.6 -0.3 3.6 3.4 3.6 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -0.2 -0.7 2.9 3.9 3.7 
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National Accounts 2014 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 83.3 85.6 2.7 1.6 1.1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.0 26.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 26.5 30.4 14.5 2.9 11.3 
Exports of Goods and Services 184.1 207.8 12.9 0.3 12.6 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.8 1.8 
   Final Demand 320.7 351.6 9.6 0.8 8.8
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services 147.7 168.1 13.8 0.6 13.2 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.8 1.9    
GDP at Market Prices 174.8 185.4 6.1 1.2 4.8 
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -27.0    
GNP at Market Prices 147.5 158.4 7.4 2.1 5.2 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.1 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 71.9 73.1 1.3 1.8 
Other 61.1 68.4 7.2 11.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.8 -1.9 
  Net Domestic Product 134.8 143.3 8.5 6.3
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -27.0 0.3 -1.1 
National Income 107.5 116.3 8.8 8.2 
Depreciation 23.7 24.0 0.3 1.4 
GNP at Factor Cost 131.2 140.3 9.1 7.0 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.3 18.1 1.8 11.1 
GNP at Market Prices 147.5 158.4 10.9 7.4 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 36.4 39.7 3.3 
F -27.3 -27.0 0.3 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.3 0.2 
Balance on Current Account 6.6 10.5 3.9 
as % of GNP 4.5 6.6 2.4 
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National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 85.6 88.7 3.6 1.6 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.0 25.9 -0.1 -0.6 0.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 30.4 34.9 14.8 2.1 12.5 
Exports of Goods and Services 207.8 220.7 6.2 1.0 5.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.8 1.0 
   Final Demand 351.6 371.3 5.6 1.1 4.4
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  168.1 176.0 4.7 0.4 4.4 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.9 1.9    
GDP at Market Prices 185.4 197.1 6.3 1.8 4.4 
Net Factor Payments  -27.0 -28.9    
GNP at Market Prices 158.4 168.2 6.2 2.0 4.1 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.1 3.2 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 73.1 76.1 2.9 4.0 
Other 68.4 76.0 7.7 11.2 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.9 -1.9 
  Net Domestic Product 143.3 154.0 10.7 7.4
Net Factor Payments -27.0 -28.9 -1.9 7.1 
National Income 116.3 125.1 8.7 7.5 
Depreciation 24.0 25.0 1.0 4.2 
GNP at Factor Cost 140.3 150.1 9.7 6.9 
Taxes less Subsidies 18.1 18.1 0.0 0.1 
GNP at Market Prices 158.4 168.2 9.8 6.2 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 39.7 44.6 4.9 
F -27.0 -28.9 -1.9 
Net Transfers -2.3 -2.4 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 10.5 13.3 2.9 
as % of GNP 6.6 7.9 1.7 
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National Accounts 2016 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 88.7 92.2 3.9 1.5 2.4 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.9 26.3 1.3 1.0 0.7 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 34.9 39.1 12.1 2.7 9.2 
Exports of Goods and Services 220.7 233.0 5.6 1.1 4.5 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1.0 1.0 
   Final Demand 371.3 391.6 5.5 1.3 4.1
less:      
Imports of Goods and Services  176.0 184.7 4.9 0.3 4.6 
Statistical Discrepancy 1.9 1.9    
GDP at Market Prices 197.1 208.8 5.9 2.2 3.7 
Net Factor Payments  -28.9 -30.6    
GNP at Market Prices 168.2 178.2 6.0 2.4 3.5 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn % 
Agriculture 3.2 3.3 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 76.1 79.1 3.0 4.0 
Other 76.0 83.3 7.3 9.6 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 0.6 0.6 
  Statistical Discrepancy -1.9 -1.9 
  Net Domestic Product 154.0 164.4 10.4 6.8
Net Factor Payments -28.9 -30.6 -1.7 5.9 
National Income 125.1 133.8 8.7 7.0 
Depreciation 25.0 25.5 0.5 2.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 150.1 159.3 9.2 6.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 18.1 19.0 0.8 4.5 
GNP at Market Prices 168.2 178.2 10.0 6.0 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2015 2016 Change in 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn 
X - M 44.6 48.3 3.6 
F -28.9 -30.6 -1.7 
Net Transfers -2.4 -2.5 -0.1 
Balance on Current Account 13.3 15.2 1.8 
as % of GNP 7.9 8.5 1.0 
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The Irish Economy - Forecast Overview and Summary 
 
We continue to believe that the Irish economy will grow strongly in 2015 with 
GNP set to increase by just over 4 per cent. Recent data from the Quarterly 
National Accounts show the economy grew by 2.3 per cent between Q3 and Q4 
2014. The strong expected performance in 2015 comes after the Irish economy 
grew by over 5 per cent in 2014 with a significant portion of that growth due to 
increases in labour productivity.  
 
While 2014 saw the sources of growth re-balancing with a greater contribution 
coming from domestic sources, foreign demand for Irish exports will continue to 
be very important for the growth outlook in 2015. The poor performance of the 
Euro Area is an ongoing concern; however, a mitigating consideration is the 
positive outlook for the US and UK markets. The recent economic assessment of 
the Euroframe1 group forecasts relatively strong performances for the US and UK 
economies with growth rates in 2015 of 3.2 and 2.8 per cent respectively. Overall, 
we expect total exports to increase by 5.1 per cent in 2015 with imports 
increasing by 4.4 per cent. 
 
Domestic sources of growth increased in relevance through 2014 and we 
envisage continued strong contributions from investment, in particular, and to a 
lesser extent consumption in 2015. In terms of the housing market, for example, 
we forecast 16,000 new housing units to be built in 2015, which is up from 11,000 
in 2014. Investment, in general, is forecast to increase by just under 13 per cent 
in 2015.  
 
The increased level of activity in the economy should see unemployment rates 
falling by the end of 2015 to less than 10 per cent for the first time since 2008. 
One interesting puzzle in the labour market is the continued stagnant rate of 
labour force participation. We expect this to increase marginally as labour market 
conditions continue to improve. 
 
We outline our first forecast for 2016 in this Commentary. Given the expected 
significant increases in investment in 2015 and continued improvements in 
productivity, we expect the Irish economy to be quite near its potential level at 
                                                          
1  The ESRI is a member of Euroframe, a network of ten independent European research institutes, which produces 
forecasts and macroeconomic policy analysis of the European economy. 
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the end of the present year. Only the rate of unemployment will be divergent 
from its long-run equivalent rate.2 Taking these factors into consideration leads 
us to a growth rate in GNP of 3.5 per cent in 2016. Based on an assumption of 
fiscal neutrality,3 we forecast a fiscal deficit in 2016 of 0.3 per cent. 
 
In this Commentary we focus, to quite an extent, on the performance of the Euro 
Area. Research Note 2015/1/2 by McQuinn and Whelan summarises a new 
research paper entitled “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and 
Without Structural Reforms”.4 Based on long-run growth forecasts from a Solow 
model, McQuinn and Whelan conclude that a baseline outlook for the European 
economy over the medium and longer-term is quite pessimistic with annual 
growth rates between 2014 and 2020 set to average only 0.7 per cent per annum. 
Additionally the research shows that, even when fairly ambitious structural 
reforms are implemented, the European economy is still likely to grow at a slower 
pace than it has in the past.  
 
The Commentary also focuses on the likely implications of the recently 
announced macro-prudential measures implemented by the Central Bank of 
Ireland. Forthcoming research by Duffy, McInerney and McQuinn5 empirically 
examines the implications of these measures for house prices, housing supply 
and mortgage lending in the Irish market. Overall, the research concludes that 
the impact of the measures will be contractionary suggesting that, while house 
price inflation may be reduced due to these new measures, this reduction may 
come at the expense of fewer houses being supplied and fewer mortgage loans 
being extended than would otherwise be the case. 
 
Finally, this Commentary introduces an Appendix, which outlines what the 
nowcasting approach, recently adopted by the Commentary, suggests is the 
current rate of GDP growth in the Irish economy. The Appendix, which will be a 
regular feature of future Commentaries, indicates that the economy is growing by 
approximately 1 per cent in Q1 2015 with respect to Q4 2014. 
 
                                                          
2  Over the period 1960 to 2014 the median unemployment rate is 7.8 per cent. 
3  Fiscal neutrality means that demand in the economy is neither stimulated nor diminished by taxation and 
Government spending. 
4  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2015). “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms”, 
ESRI and UCD Working Paper, forthcoming. 
5  Duffy D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2015). “Macro-Prudential Policy in a Recovering Housing Market: Too Much 
Too Soon?” ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
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The International Economy 
 
Since the last Commentary, inflation fell further from target in most developed 
countries, while worldwide growth in the second half of 2014 proved to be 
weaker than expected. This has prompted monetary policy actions from a 
number of authorities in response, most notably the launching of the European 
Central Bank’s Quantitative Easing (QE) programme. Declining oil prices have 
played a major part in the widespread fall in inflation. The oil price movements 
should, however, provide some stimulus to global growth. There is also 
considerable benefit to Ireland and the Euro Area from the recent depreciation of 
the Euro versus other major currencies. Figure 1 shows forecast growth in 
Ireland’s main trading partners. The United States and United Kingdom 
economies are forecast to grow by approximately 3 per cent and 2.5 per cent 
respectively. The Euro Area returned to some growth in 2014 and is forecast to 
grow moderately in 2015 and 2016 also.  
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year-on-year)
 
    Euro Area     United States      United Kingdom 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The World Economy 
Oil prices fell by approximately a half between the second quarter of 2014 and 
the first quarter of 2015, caused by strong supply, weak demand growth and 
accumulating oil inventories. Growth in global oil demand has been hampered by 
general international macroeconomic weakness and has been outstripped by 
supply. In November, OPEC decided not to cut its supply levels, widely seen as an 
Actual outturn Forecast range Actual outturn and median of forecasts
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attempt to defend its market share against competition from US shale oil and gas 
production. The US producers have relatively higher costs of production and 
require the price per barrel of oil to be higher to break even. The year to date has 
seen oil supply begin to respond, however, and the International Energy Agency 
forecasts that oil supply will continue to fall in 2015. Oil price forecasts from the 
Energy Information Administration put Brent crude oil prices at US$58 per barrel 
in 2015 and US$75 per barrel in 2016, compared with the January 2015 trough of 
US$48 per barrel. 
 
In a recent assessment of the Euro Area and global economies, Euroframe 
included a simulation6 of the potential stimulatory impacts of the recent drop in 
oil prices7 on economic growth. This simulation includes two scenarios; one in 
which the decline in oil prices is permanent and one where it is temporary. The 
baseline forecasts for global GDP growth for 2015 and 2016 are 3.7 per cent and 
3.8 per cent respectively. A permanent fall in oil prices gives rise to an additional 
0.5 per cent growth in each year. The United States is shown to benefit more 
strongly from a permanent fall than the Euro Area due to the US having more oil-
intensive production in its economy. A temporary decline in oil prices also has a 
positive impact on global growth; however the magnitude of the impact is much 
smaller. Given the open nature of the Irish economy, Ireland would be likely to 
benefit by more than the Euro Area average from the increase in global growth 
following the oil price shock. 
 
The recent movements in energy prices have been the largest contributor to 
worldwide falling inflation, leaving inflation rates significantly below target. In 
contrast to previous episodes in which oil prices fell significantly, nominal interest 
rates are currently close to the zero lower bound. This leaves little scope for 
conventional monetary policy to become more accommodative so as to offset the 
impact on consumer prices. As a result, it is likely that inflation will remain low for 
some time to come. With market-based measures of inflation expectations falling 
appreciably over the last year, the anchoring of inflation expectations has 
become a significant cause for concern. 
 
                                                          
6  The simulation was conducted using the NiGEM model of the world economy from the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research. 
7  The Euroframe simulation assumes a Dollar/Euro exchange rate of approximately 1.25 in 2015 and 2016. This is 
substantially higher than the current exchange rate. Euroframe notes the potential for output and demand to grow 
faster than expected as a result of more favourable exchange rates. 
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The Euro Area Economy 
Real GDP in the Euro Area grew by 0.9 per cent in 2014, marking annual GDP 
growth for the first time since 2011. As emphasised by Figure 1, growth in the 
Euro Area remains weaker and more uncertain than in other major economies. 
Economic data for the Euro Area provide a mixed picture; some indicators show 
growth returning or picking up, while others remain less promising. The Euro Area 
unemployment rate was 11.2 per cent in January, down from 11.3 per cent in the 
previous month and from 11.8 per cent in January 2014. An increasing rate of 
money supply growth and a return to growth in loans to the private sector are 
also indicative of a return to economic growth. However, GDP growth continues 
to lag particularly badly in France and Italy. Recent research8 has shown that the 
structural reforms typically called for by Euro Area institutions are not likely to 
provide a strong addition to Euro Area growth over the medium term. 
 
Euro Area policies and institutions continue to provide an ongoing source of 
debate. It is unlikely that fiscal policy across the Euro Area will provide any 
stimulus to growth over the next two years, leaving it necessary for monetary 
policy to become more accommodative. The negotiations in early 2015 between 
the Greek government and its creditors proved to be much more prolonged and 
difficult than was expected. The negotiations were reminiscent of earlier years of 
the Euro crisis, with frequent talk of exit from the single currency against a 
backdrop of rising sovereign bond yields and deposit flight from the banking 
sector. While an interim deal was reached, these negotiations serve as a 
reminder that Europe and its institutions are not beyond returning to crisis 
situations. 
 
Annual inflation in the Euro Area was -0.3 per cent in February, a small increase 
from -0.6 per cent in January, with 15 of the 19 members of the Euro Area in 
deflation in February. Energy price inflation was -7.9 per cent in February while 
core inflation, excluding energy prices, was 0.6 per cent. While falling energy 
prices have played a significant part in the low inflation across most developed 
countries, core inflation in the Euro Area is low and had been falling throughout 
2014. In January, ECB President Mario Draghi highlighted the possibility of 
“second-round effects” from low inflation. Despite the significant impact of 
energy prices, low rates of inflation could lead to impacts on wage and price-
setting and affect inflation developments over the medium term. This point is 
underscored by recent declines in a range of market-based measures of inflation 
expectations. Given deflation and the possibility of inflation expectations 
                                                          
8  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2015). “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms”, 
ESRI and UCD Working Paper, forthcoming. 
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becoming more unfavourable to price stability, monetary policy had not been 
sufficiently accommodative to deal with the risks of a deflationary spiral. 
 
Against this backdrop, in January the ECB announced a range of new measures to 
achieve its price stability objective. The most notable of these measures is the 
launching of a QE programme, one which purchases sovereign bonds in addition 
to the existing programmes to purchase asset-backed securities and covered 
bonds. The programme started in March 2015 and involves the Euro System 
making €60 billion in purchases per month until September 2016 at least. The 
announced schedule for these purchases allows sufficient scope for them to 
continue further, should that be necessary to achieve a sustained adjustment in 
the path of inflation. Initially, QE is set to expand the ECB balance sheet by over 
€1 trillion, or approximately 10 per cent of Euro Area nominal GDP. This is 
relatively moderate in size compared with recent QE programmes in the US (20 
per cent of GDP), UK (25 per cent of GDP) and Japan (40 per cent of GDP). 
 
The QE programme has had an immediate impact as a foreign exchange 
instrument and is likely to continue to do so. Weakening the Euro further will 
benefit Euro Area exporters and thereby have the welcome impact of promoting 
growth. Furthermore, QE helps the ECB to achieve its mandate by leading to 
imported inflation, with the effect magnified if QE leads to outward investment 
flows into foreign currency debt. QE is likely to have a signalling effect also 
because, as noted above, the ECB has given guidance that it will continue the 
programme until at least September 2016. In January, the ECB also lowered the 
cost of borrowing as part of its TLTRO operations to increase lending to the real 
economy. 
 
While the announcement of Euro Area QE has been widely welcomed, the 
practical implementation has received some criticism. The Euro Area and United 
States, for example, have significant differences which may lead to QE being less 
effective in Europe. In the US, the dominance of household debt over liquid 
assets means that lower real interest rates lead to greater household spending. 
The opposite holds in Germany9 and France.10 Rising stock market valuations also 
do not spur spending in Euro Area households as much as American ones, given 
households in Europe hold less in equities. 
                                                          
9  Geiger, F., J. Muellbauer and M. Rupprecht (2014). “The Housing Market, Household Portfolios and the German 
Consumer”. Presented at the Bundesbank, DFG and IMF conference, Eltville, June 2014. 
10  Chauvin, V. and J. Muellbauer (2013). “Consumption, Household Portfolios and the Housing Market: a Flow of Funds 
Approach for France”. Presented at Banque de France, December 2013. 
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The US Economy 
As noted in the Winter Commentary, discussion in the US has turned to the 
normalisation of monetary policy. Given recent inflation developments and 
relatively weaker economic growth in the second half of 2014, it now appears 
likely that interest rates will rise in the second half of 2015, rather than the first. 
In its communication, the Federal Open Market Committee has said that it will 
wait for further improvement in the labour market, and until it is reasonably 
confident that inflation is returning to target over the medium term, before it 
raises the federal funds rate. Market expectations indicate that the first rise will 
occur in the second half of 2015, with the federal funds rate eventually rising to 
1.5 per cent by 2018. Headline CPI inflation was -0.7 per cent in January, driven 
by a 9.7 per cent fall in energy prices. 
 
Real GDP in the US rose by 2.4 per cent in 2014 compared with 2013. For the 
fourth quarter, growth was 2.2 per cent, revised down from 2.6 per cent in the 
advanced estimate. This represented a slowdown in the rate of growth from the 
4.6 and 5.0 per cent growth rates in the second and third quarters respectively. 
While real personal consumption expenditure grew at a stronger rate than in the 
previous quarter, investment growth slowed and net trade provided a drag on 
GDP growth. Real exports grew at 3.2 per cent in the fourth quarter compared 
with growth of 4.5 per cent in Q3, while imports grew at 10.1 per cent in Q4 
compared with -0.9 per cent in Q3. The robust economic growth in the United 
States is significant for Irish exports, contrasting with the still-tentative recovery 
in the Euro Area. 
 
The unemployment rate in the United States was 5.5 per cent in February, falling 
slightly from 5.6 per cent the previous month. The unemployment rate has fallen 
from 6.7 per cent in February 2014. Employment growth in February was 
295,000, exceeding market expectations, and marking the 12th consecutive 
month of jobs growth in excess of 200,000. There has also been a trend of pro-
cyclical revisions in US employment data over the last year, with revised 
estimates for November and December adding 147,000 jobs, bringing the total 
for those months to 752,000. Under-utilisation of labour appears to be a 
lessening problem in the US, with some indicators such as long-term 
unemployment and marginal attachment to the labour force improving. The 
labour force participation rate has remained near historic lows over the past year, 
however, and there has been little wage growth despite the tightening labour 
market. 
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The UK Economy 
Inflation in the United Kingdom was 0.3 per cent in January, a fall from 0.5 per 
cent in December. Like the Euro Area and US, inflation in the UK has fallen 
significantly below its target. The Bank of England forecasts inflation to fall 
further in the short term and into negative territory, due to continued pass-
through of falling energy prices. Based on international forward interest rates, 
markets have priced in a mid-2016 interest rate rise in the UK, with the Bank Rate 
reaching 1 per cent by 2018. This represents a later initial interest rate rise and a 
more gradual schedule of rises than had been the expectation during the second 
half of 2014. 
 
Real GDP in the United Kingdom grew by 0.5 per cent quarter-on-quarter in Q4 
2014 and by 2.7 per cent compared with the same quarter of 2013, according to 
the Office for National Statistics. GDP for the year 2014 as a whole rose by 2.6 per 
cent compared with 2013. The peak-to-trough decline in GDP was 6 per cent, a 
deeper impact than the 5.5 per cent decline in the early 1970s downturn, the 5.6 
per cent decline of early 1980s, and 2.2 per cent of the early 1990s. The recovery 
in growth has proved to be weaker than from these previous recessions also, 
taking longer to exceed the pre-downturn peak and having less cumulative 
growth in like-for-like comparisons of the recoveries. Despite its historical 
weakness, the recovery in the UK has importance for Ireland given the United 
Kingdom’s stature among Ireland’s trade partners. Similarly, the recovering UK 
labour market has pass-through effects on the labour market in Ireland. 
 
The unemployment rate fell to 5.7 per cent in the fourth quarter, from 6.0 per 
cent the previous quarter and from 7.2 per cent the previous year. Quarterly 
employment growth was 103,000 in the fourth quarter, with an increase of 
608,000 compared with Q4 2013. As a result, the employment rate rose to 73.2 
per cent of the working age population, compared with 72 per cent a year earlier. 
The UK employment rate is the highest it has been since records began in 1971. 
With labour force participation flat for the year, employment growth is the driver 
of the declining unemployment rate.  
 
Monetary Developments in Other European Economies 
The year to date has seen some significant events take place in European 
countries which are not members of the Euro Area. In the week before the ECB 
announced its QE programme in January, Switzerland surprised markets by 
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abandoning its currency cap versus the Euro.11 The SNB cited divergent monetary 
policies between the Euro Area and United States and the likelihood that this 
would become even more pronounced. In addition, the Rouble crisis had meant 
that investors in search of a “safe haven” had led to further pressure on the 
Franc. The abandonment of the cap is likely to hurt Swiss exporters, given the 
subsequent appreciation of the Franc. 
 
Similar inflows of foreign currency have been observed in Denmark, particularly 
in the wake of the moves by the SNB and ECB. To inhibit these flows, the 
Nationalbank cut its deposit rate four times between January 1 and February 5, 
from -0.1 per cent finally to -0.75 per cent. It has also committed to unlimited 
interventions in foreign exchange markets to maintain its policy of a fixed 
exchange rate between the Krone and Euro. In Sweden, in response to low 
inflation and fears of expectations of low inflation becoming entrenched, the 
Riksbank became the first central bank to bring its main policy rate into negative 
territory, while it also launched a QE programme. 
 
                                                          
11  Since 2011, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had implemented a cap which prevented the Swiss Franc from rising above 
CHF 1.20 versus the Euro. 
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The Domestic Economy 
 
Output 
The recovery in the Irish economy, evident since mid-2013, gathered apace 
through 2014 with overall GNP growing by just over 5 per cent. Figure 2 
demonstrates the degree to which the speed of growth increased throughout 
2014 as growth forecasts picked up significantly in the third quarter. We expect 
this strong performance to continue into 2015 with output set to increase by just 
over 4 per cent.  
 
FIGURE 2 Irish Real GDP and GNP Year-on-Year Forecasts for 2015 (%)  
 
 
Source:  QEC forecasts. 
 
The sizeable increase in activity indicated by the CSO Quarterly National Accounts 
in September 2014 was picked up by the nowcasting model now used in the 
Commentary to accompany the standard forecasting exercise.12 Key variables in 
the nowcasting model indicate strong growth, including PMI (Purchasing 
Managers’ Indices), retail sales and certain housing market variables. Moving into 
2015, the approach suggests that the economy grew by approximately 1 per cent 
between Q4 2014 and Q1 2015. 
 
In this Commentary we publish our initial forecast for 2016. In thinking about a 
more medium-term outlook for the economy, we use a growth accounting 
                                                          
12  See Appendix for more details on the latest nowcasting estimates. 
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framework presented in Byrne and McQuinn (2014)13 and McQuinn and Whelan 
(2015).14 This approach takes into account the productive capacity of the 
economy and, consequently, enables us to establish whether the economy is 
operating at or near potential levels of output.  
 
Our analysis suggests that, given the relatively strong outlook for 2015, the Irish 
economy is set to be almost at its potential level by the end of the year. Key 
parameters such as the investment rate and total factor productivity growth will 
be at or slightly above their long-run median values by the end of 2015, with only 
the unemployment rate still divergent from its long-run equivalent path. Based 
on this medium-term perspective, we would expect that GNP will grow by 3.5 per 
cent in 2016. Figure 3 illustrates that, even with these strong forecasts, both GNP 
and GDP will only be back to the pre-financial crisis peak in 2007 by the end of 
2016. The full extent of the lost output due to the financial crisis is clearly 
apparent from the graph. 
 
FIGURE 3 Actual (1995-2014) and Forecast (2015-2016) Level of Irish Real GDP and GNP (2007 = 100) 
 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and QEC forecasts. 
 
A key feature of economic performance in 2014 was the extent to which 
domestic demand and investment, in particular, played an increasing role in 
overall performance. Housing supply would appear to be increasing with the 
overall number of units built in 2015 projected to exceed 16,000 for the first time 
since 2009. Business investment is also likely to witness significant increases 
through 2015. While overall consumption levels have increased somewhat 
                                                          
13  Byrne, D. and K. McQuinn (2014). "Irish Economic Performance 1987-2013: A Growth Accounting Assessment". 
Research Note 2014/4/1. 
14  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2015). “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms”, 
ESRI and UCD Working Paper, forthcoming. 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
GDP
12  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  S p r i ng  20 15  
 
marginally, retail sales and car sales, in particular, saw large increases for the 
second half of last year. Our outlook for consumption is influenced by the 
significant levels of household debt which still prevail in the economy. 
Unfortunately, the near glacial speed with which households’ balance sheets are 
being repaired, highlighted especially by the slow pace of the mortgage arrears 
resolution process, continues to act as a drag on economic activity. 
 
Foreign demand for Irish goods and services is expected to continue to be an 
important part of the economic recovery in 2015. There would appear to be two 
sets of countervailing forces confronting the domestic economy; recent forecasts 
from the Euroframe group indicate that both the United States and the United 
Kingdom (still significant trading partners) are set to experience robust rates of 
economic activity in 2015 and 2016. However, the growth outlook for the Euro 
Area, as comprehensively assessed in McQuinn and Whelan (2015), continues to 
face significant structural as well as cyclical challenges. 
 
Of the 5 per cent growth rate in the Irish economy in 2014, analysis of the labour 
market suggests that a sizeable component of the growth (3 per cent) is due to 
productivity developments with the residual due to employment growth. Our 
outlook for the labour market in 2015 indicates that the unemployment rate will 
be less than 10 per cent for the first time since 2008. Overall growth in the 
economy of at least 3.5 per cent in 2016 would see the unemployment rate down 
to its long-run median rate of approximately 8 per cent by the end of that year. 
 
TABLE 1 Industry and Output 
 
2013 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ bn % % % % 
Agriculture 3.8 16.5 10.0 7.0 8.0 
Industry 35.2 -2.3 1.1 3.0 4.0 
Distribution, Transport, Software 
and Communications 43.9 -5.2 8.0 9.0 10.0 
Public Administration and Defence 6.3 -2.2 1.1 2.0 3.0 
Other Services 68.2 2.4 3.4 3.5 -1.5 
GVA at Factor Cost 158.5 -0.4 4.3 5.1 3.6 
Source:  ESRI forecasts. 
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Monetary and Financial Conditions 
In January, the Central Bank announced the results of its consultation process 
concerning the proposed macro-prudential regulations15 announced in October 
2014. The measures introduce proportionate limits for loan-to-value (LTV) and 
loan-to-income (LTI) ratios for principal dwelling houses and for LTV ratios for 
buy-to-let mortgages. One modification to emerge following the consultation 
process was a higher loan-to-value limit being set for first-time buyers on the first 
€220,000 of the value of a residential property. In the Winter Commentary, Duffy 
and McQuinn (2014) had outlined a counter-cyclical rules approach which 
suggested that the specific limits for the LTVs and LTIs be set on the basis of a 
regular analysis of four different criteria which evaluate the state of the property 
and mortgage credit market. While the Central Bank has acknowledged that there 
will be some counter-cyclical dimension to these regulations, we still feel that an 
explicit rules-based approach would result in greater transparency and a more 
efficient overall market outcome.  
 
Also, it is not clear what the rationale is for first-time buyers enjoying relatively 
more liberal conditions. A wide number of studies such as Chambers, Garriga and 
Schlagenhauf (2007a, 2007b and 2008) and Ortal-Magné and Rady (1999) and 
(2006)16 conclude that when credit conditions are liberalised it is relatively 
younger and poorer households who tend to “benefit” from greater credit 
provision. In an Irish context, Duffy and O’Hanlon (2014)17 find that first-time 
buyers are more likely to be in negative equity, with, for example, over 79 per 
cent of FTBs who drew down a mortgage between 2005 and 2012 experiencing 
negative equity.  Thus, if the purpose of the new regime is to prevent households 
from experiencing credit-related issues, it is unclear why the conditions should be 
less binding for first-time buyers. 
 
In terms of overall deleveraging, the private sector continued, in net terms, to 
repay loans with Irish banks during the second half of 2014. Non-Financial 
                                                          
15  In the “Household Sector Consumption” section, we discuss the implications of the macro-prudential measures on 
the rental market, while the possible effects on housing supply are discussed in the “Supply Conditions” section.  
16  Chambers, S.M., C. Carriga and D. Schlagenhauf (2007a). “Mortgage Contracts and Housing Tenure Decisions”. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2007-040A, September 2007.  
Chambers, S.M., C. Carriga and D. Schlagenhauf (2007b). “Equilibrium Mortgage Choice and Housing Tenure Decisions 
with Refinancing”. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper 2007-25, December 2007.  
Chambers S.M., C. Carriga and D. Schlagenhauf (2008). “The Loan Structure and Housing Tenure Decisions in an 
Equilibrium Model of Mortgage Choice”. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2008-024B, July 2008.  
Ortal-Magné and S. Rady (1999). “Boom In, Bust Out: Young Households and the Housing Price Cycle”. European 
Economic Review, 43, pp. 755-766.  
Ortal-Magné and S. Rady (2006). “Housing Market Dynamics: On the Contribution of Income Shocks and Credit 
Constraints”. The Review of Economic Studies, 73, No. 2, pp. 459-485. 
17  Duffy, D., and N. O’Hanlon (2014). “Negative Equity in Ireland: Estimates Using Loan Level Data”.  Journal of European 
Real Estate Research, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp 327-344.  
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Corporation (NFC) loan repayments continued to exceed draw-downs in 
December 2014. The monthly decrease in December of €1.5 billion was reflected 
across all three maturity categories of NFC loans - short, medium, and long-term. 
The post-crisis decline in NFC lending was initially concentrated in longer-term 
loans, while short-term loans including the use of overdrafts continued to 
increase, albeit at a much slower pace. Lending to Irish resident NFCs reported a 
year-on-year decline of 7.2 per cent in December 2014, following an annual 
decrease of 6.4 per cent in November. Longer-term NFC lending has been 
declining since mid-2013 which may be an indication of a declining investment 
focus in the NFC sector. However, the pace of decline has slowed in recent 
months.  
 
Certain sectors of the economy are registering increases in lending. For example 
new business lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), excluding 
financial intermediation and property-related sectors, increased during Q3 2014 
for the third consecutive quarter. Financial Intermediation and the property-
related sectors of Real Estate and Construction activities account for 
approximately 80 per cent of total credit advanced. Of the remaining 21 per cent, 
Wholesale/Retail Trade and Repairs, Hotels and Restaurants, Manufacturing and 
Primary industries are the main sectors accessing credit from Irish resident credit 
institutions. To provide an indication of current lending practices within the Irish 
economy, Figure 4 plots credit advanced by sector in Q4 2014. 
 
FIGURE 4 Credit Advanced by Sector 
 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
Certain Irish financial institutions have, of late, returned to profitability for the 
first time since 2008. In the first half of 2014, Allied Irish Bank and Bank of 
Ireland, in particular, have both recorded profit-before-tax of €437 million and 
€327 million respectively. While the continued presence of both mortgage 
arrears and other non-performing loans hinders a more robust recovery in the 
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balance sheets of Irish credit institutions, the improving profitability and the 
completion of the ECB stress tests in Q4 2014 should see an increase in the 
amount of credit extended to the real economy in 2015. 
 
Ireland raised €4 billion at its first 30-year bond sale buoyed, to a certain extent, 
by the European Central Bank QE program outlined in January which includes 
government bond purchases. The 30-year debt was sold at a yield of just below 
2.1 per cent with investors bidding over €11.2 billion in the sale. Along with 
raising €4 billion in 7-year debt in early January, the National Treasury 
Management Agency (NTMA) is already half way towards meeting its target of 
€12 - €15 billion in long-term bonds. Most recently, the NTMA auctioned off €500 
million of the benchmark 15-year government bond at a yield of 1.56 per cent. 
Total bids received amounted to €1,576 million which was 3.15 times the amount 
on offer.  
 
In mid-February the yield on the 10-year Irish sovereign fell below 1 per cent for 
the first time, as fears of Greece exiting the euro zone receded. This has been 
viewed as further evidence of Ireland’s strong recovery from the debt crisis. In 
the short term, the improvement in borrowing costs is a positive development for 
Irish sovereign bonds. However, as noted in previous Commentaries, any 
deterioration of international sentiment will have significant implications for the 
borrowing costs of both the State and domestic financial institutions.  
 
Prices and Earnings 
The annual rate of inflation was negative for the third month in a row in February. 
Data from the CSO show that prices on average, as measured by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), were 0.5 per cent lower in February 2015 compared with 12 
months previously, the lowest level in four and a half years. Similarly, prices on 
average, as measured by the EU Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), 
decreased by 0.4 per cent compared with February 2014.  
 
However, consumer prices in February, as measured by the CPI, rose by 0.6 per 
cent in the month. While deflation is a threat for Ireland, and with euro zone 
inflation far below the 2 per cent target, it is widely accepted that Ireland is in a 
much stronger position than the euro zone as a whole. Also, while the CPI has 
been negative for three successive months, much of the fall has been influenced 
by global trends in oil prices and interest rates. Both of these lower costs are, of 
course, positive developments for the consumer.  
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Water supply and sewage collection charges were introduced in Ireland on 1 
January 2015. The coverage of the CPI/HICP is defined as those goods and 
services purchased by households for the purposes of consumption. The 
contribution of water supply added 0.22 per cent and sewage collection added 
0.19 per cent to the annual inflation rate.  
 
We forecast that inflation will remain subdued in 2015 and 2016 but will rise 
slightly compared to the rate recorded in 2014. These modest increases reflect 
both the combination of increased domestic economic activity and increases in 
Euro Area inflation rates due, partially, to the QE measures announced in January. 
 
TABLE 2 Inflation Measures 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 
  Annual Change 
  % % % % 
CPI 0.5 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.5 
HICP 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.2 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI forecasts. 
 
Preliminary estimates from the CSO on Earnings and Labour Costs for Q4 2014 
reveal that Average Hourly Earnings increased by 1.7 per cent over the year. This 
compares with a decrease of 1.6 per cent in the year to Q3 2014 from €21.36 to 
€21.02 per hour. 
 
To put recent increases in context, we note that in the four years to Q4 2014, 
overall Average Hourly Earnings increased by just 0.2 per cent. Across the sectors 
hourly earnings have increased in seven of the 13 sectors. The largest percentage 
increase was recorded in the Information and Communication sector which rose 
8.5 per cent. The largest percentage decrease in Average Hourly Earnings over 
the same period was recorded in the Human Health and Social Work sector, 
which was down 5.7 per cent. As in previous Commentaries, we assume that the 
falling numbers in the public sector may help to explain the aforementioned 
falling Average Hourly Earnings. If those leaving employment earned above the 
average wage then this change in the composition of the public sector workforce 
would inevitably lower the average earnings in this sector. Within the private 
sector Average Hourly Earnings increased 2.4 per cent in the year to Q4 2014, 
while public sector hourly earnings rose by 0.2 per cent in the same period.  
 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S pr in g  201 5 |  17  
 
We forecast growth in average earnings of 1 per cent in 2015 and 2016. While 
these increases may appear somewhat modest, it is worth noting that 
unemployment, while falling in 2015 and 2016, will still be above its long-run 
median rate by the end of 2016. The continued presence of over-capacity in the 
Irish labour market may well result in modest wage and pay increases. In some 
respects, this is similar to developments in the U.S. and U.K. labour markets at 
present; falling unemployment rates have not resulted in a significant increase in 
wage rates. We also forecast current transfers (social welfare payments) will 
continue to decline in line with the rise in employment. Based on the increase in 
employment we also forecast a continuing increase in personal disposable 
income. 
 
Components of Demand 
Exports, Imports and Balance of Payments 
The latest CSO figures indicate that exports (merchandise) fell by 5 per cent in the 
month to January 2015 but were up 15 per cent on an annual basis. Similarly, 
imports were up 8 per cent over the year to January 2015 but recorded a 1 per 
cent drop from December 2014. In the 12 months to December 2014 both 
exports and imports increased (in volume terms) by 17 per cent and 9 per cent 
respectively. 
 
In 2014 the value of imports reached its highest level since 2008. The main 
contributors to growth were Machinery and Transport Equipment, at 27 per cent, 
and Chemicals and Related Products, at 21 per cent. In 2014, 30 per cent of Irish 
imports came from the UK with the US accounting for 11 per cent of total imports 
for the year.   
 
In terms of Irish exports, both the US and the UK continue to be our largest single 
trading partners. In total, the US (22 per cent), UK (13 per cent), Belgium (13 per 
cent) and Germany (7 per cent) made up 55 per cent of total exports from Ireland 
in 2014. With very low growth rates and the threat of deflation in the Euro Area 
there has been some concern that Irish exports will be adversely affected. As 
seen in Table 3 however, growth in the UK and US remains relatively strong 
compared to the Euro Area. It is also worth noting that the euro currency is 
currently at its lowest value for 12 years against the dollar and its lowest level for 
seven years against Sterling. This weakness will provide a further boost to exports 
to both the US and UK. 
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TABLE 3 Proportion of Total Exports from Ireland (%) and Growth Rates 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Proportion of Total Exports from Ireland (per cent) 
UK (incl. Northern Ireland) 15.5 15.6 16.5 16.2 15.1 
EU Member States (excl. UK & NI) 42.6 42.0 42.5 40.8  39.7 
US & Canada 24.2 24.4 20.7 22.0 23.0 
 
Growth Rate (GDP) 
UK 1.9 1.6 0.7 1.7 2.6 
EU Member States 2.0 1.8 -0.4 0.1 1.3 
US 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.2 2.4 
Sources: Central Statistics Office and Euroframe. 
 
Export developments in 2014 were dominated by the impact of foreign 
processing of Irish-owned goods for export, or what is commonly known as 
“contract manufacturing”. While this is a long-standing feature of Irish trade, 
changes in the business structure of multinational enterprises during 2014 led to 
a change in the size of this activity. In the most recent Quarterly National 
Accounts, the CSO reiterated the fact that the related addition to gross value 
added from contract manufacturing, over and above wages and salaries paid, is 
not particularly significant in explaining the recent growth in Irish GDP. We 
forecast that any growth associated with this phenomenon will begin to dissipate 
in 2015 and 2016.  
 
A Balance of Payments current account surplus of 7.7 per cent of GDP was 
recorded in Q4 2014. Compared with Q4 2013, merchandise exports were up 27 
per cent while merchandise imports were up 16.5 per cent. On the services side, 
exports were up 8 per cent over the same period. This was mainly due to 
increased computer services exports of 13 per cent. Services imports experienced 
an increase of almost 22 per cent driven primarily by growth in royalties and 
licensing payments of 38.5 per cent. 
 
Based on the declining relevance of contract manufacturing, we forecast growth 
in merchandise exports of 7 per cent in 2015 with a further growth of 5.2 per cent 
in 2016. We also forecast that the growth in total services will continue in 2015 
and 2016. Following on from very strong growth recorded for total exports of 
goods and services (volume) in 2014, we forecast that growth rates will return to 
relatively more modest levels in 2015 and 2016. Our forecasts for imports in 2015 
remain largely unchanged from the Winter Commentary. We forecast similar 
levels of growth in both merchandise and services imports into 2016. 
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Household Sector Consumption  
Certain indicators suggest that increases can be expected in household 
consumption levels in 2015. The volume of retail sales grew by 8.8 per cent year-
on-year in January 2015. When car sales are excluded, there was an increase of 
0.1 per cent in the volume of retail sales in January 2015 when compared with 
the month previous and an increase of 4.8 per cent in the annual figure. The 
number of new private cars licensed for the first time increased by 29.2 per cent 
in February 2015 compared to February 2014, while the number of new goods 
vehicles licensed was up 58 per cent from January 2014.  
 
Similarly, the three-month moving average of the KBC Ireland/ESRI Consumer 
Sentiment Index continues on an upward trend increasing from 92.3 in January to 
95.9 in February. When compared to values of 83.3 in February 2014 and 57.8 in 
2013, there is strong evidence that consumer confidence has grown steadily over 
the past two years. 
 
However, as can be seen in Figure 5, lending to Irish households continues to fall 
on an annual basis, decreasing by 3.7 per cent in December 2014. Loans for house 
purchase, which account for 81 per cent of total household loans, declined at an 
annual rate of 2.7 per cent. Lending for consumption and other purposes also 
declined by 7.5 per cent year-on-year.  
 
FIGURE 5 Lending to Irish Resident Households (Annual Percentage Change) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland. 
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Additionally, along with other sectors of the economy, household deleveraging 
continued into December 2014 with loan repayments exceeding new draw-
downs by €3.9 billion over the entire year. In the Winter Commentary we noted 
that household loan draw-downs exceeded repayments in September 2014 for 
the first time since September 2013. This relationship reversed again in 
December with household loan repayments exceeding draw-downs by €43 
million during the month.  In the case of loans for house purchase, repayments 
exceeded draw-downs by €2.2 billion in the year to end-December 2014. 
Repayments also exceeded draw-downs by €1.7 billion for non-housing loans to 
households in 2014.   
 
Consequently, in forecasting consumption levels it is evident that legacy effects 
from the financial crisis may still act as a drag in this area. Micro-level evidence of 
the effects of deleveraging on household consumption for Irish households is 
evident in McCarthy and McQuinn.18 Based on the most recent Quarterly 
National Accounts from the CSO for the year 2014, personal consumption 
increased by just 1.1 per cent between 2013 and 2014. Therefore, in combining 
the overall effects of increased earnings and growing employment with the 
continued presence of distressed household balance sheets, we forecast 
relatively modest increases in consumption of 2 per cent and 2.4 per cent in 2015 
and 2016 respectively. 
 
Property Market Developments 
In January residential property prices fell by 1.4 per cent nationwide. This is the 
largest fall in national prices observed in a single month since February 2012. 
Despite this fall, residential property prices remain 15.5 per cent higher than 12 
months previous. In Dublin residential property prices fell by 1.9 per cent in 
January, while house prices outside of Dublin fell by less than 1 per cent in 
January. Overall, as seen in Figure 6, residential prices are still substantially higher 
than the same period last year with a 21.6 per cent rise in Dublin and an annual 
increase of 9.3 per cent in the rest of the country.  
 
                                                          
18  McCarthy, Y. and K. McQuinn (2014). “Deleveraging in a highly indebted property market: who does it and are there 
implications for household consumption?”. Research Technical Papers, 05/RT/14, Central Bank of Ireland. 
Q uar te r l y  Eco nomic  Comm en ta ry  –  S pr in g  201 5 |  21  
 
FIGURE 6 Residential Property Price Index (Base Jan 2005 =100) 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
In spite of substantial house price increases in recent months and in light of the 
small decline recorded in January, house prices in Dublin are currently 38.5 per 
cent lower than at their highest level in early 2007. Outside of Dublin, residential 
property prices are also substantially lower (41.9 per cent) than their highest level 
in September 2007. In Duffy, McInerney and McQuinn,19 the estimates from a 
house price model in McQuinn20 are updated. This suggests that, as of Q4 2014, 
Irish house prices were still undervalued by approximately 10 per cent. 
 
The introduction of the new macro-prudential measures by the Central Bank is 
likely to lead to some uncertainty in terms of how key housing variables evolve 
over the next year. Duffy et al., using the Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney21 model, 
examine the impact of the LTV and LTI restrictions on mortgage credit levels, 
house prices and housing supply. Overall, they find that house prices and housing 
supply declines by approximately 4 per cent to 5 per cent vis-à-vis a baseline level 
due to these measures. The impact may take up to four years to be fully realised. 
Duffy et al. also find that mortgage lending may fall by between 15 to 20 per cent 
due to these measures.  
 
One other area affecting certain households which may also be impacted by the 
recent macro-prudential measures is the rental market. As can be seen from 
                                                          
19  Duffy, D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2015). “Macro-Prudential Policy in a Recovering Housing Market: Too Much 
Too Soon?” ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
20  McQuinn, K. (2014). “Bubble, Bubble Toil and Trouble? An Assessment of the Current State of the Irish Housing 
Market”. Special Article, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Summer 2014. 
21  Gerlach-Kristen, P. and N. McInerney (2014). “The Role of Credit in the Housing Market”, ESRI Working Paper No. 495. 
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Figure 7, rental rates in the economy have been trending upwards since early 
2012, with the CSO rate, in particular, indicating that present rental rates are 
almost back to the peak of the “boom” period. While house prices fell by over 50 
per cent during the recession, the peak to trough in the rental market was lower, 
with a decline at just over 25 per cent. This may in part be due to the increase in 
the number of households opting to rent, as shown in Census 2011. Between 
2006 and 2011 the number of households in Ireland increased by 187,000 or 
almost 13 per cent, to 1,649,000, while the number of households renting 
increased by 160,060. Thus, almost 86 per cent of the households formed 
between 2006 and 2011 were in the private rented sector. 
 
There has been some speculation that the introduction of the new limits on LTVs 
and LTIs may lead to further increases in rents as certain marginal households 
may not now be able to raise the new down-payment level required. Certain 
aspects of the housing literature do lend some credence to this viewpoint; Duca, 
Muellbauer and Murphy,22 for example, show that in the case of the US rental 
market, when limits were imposed on LTVs, rents were permanently increased for 
a given house price level. 
 
FIGURE 7 CSO and PRTB/ESRI Rent Index (Index Q3 2007 = 100) 
 
Sources:  CSO and PRTB/ESRI. 
                                                          
22  Duca J., J. Muellbauer and A. Murphy (2011). “House Prices and Credit Constraints: Making Sense of the U.S. 
Experience”.  Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Vol. 121(552), pp. 533-551. 
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Supply Conditions 
Investment 
Preliminary National Accounts data for 2014 show that the volume of investment 
grew by 11.3 per cent in 2014. Analysis of available indicators continues to 
suggest that investment will make a large contribution to growth in domestic 
demand and hence to economic growth over the short term. Registrations, 
completions and planning permissions suggest that the volume of housing 
completions will increase again in each of the next two years, to an annual 
average of 18,000 units in 2016. This remains below the rate of new household 
formation, estimated at approximately 25,000 new households per annum (Duffy, 
Byrne and FitzGerald23). Growth in construction will also be driven by a 
continuation of the upward trend in commercial construction. Thus, the volume 
of investment in building and construction is forecast to grow by 14 per cent in 
2015. Having grown strongly in both 2014 and 2015, some moderation in growth 
is expected in 2016 at over 13 per cent, although this in part will reflect the 
higher base. However, as noted in the previous section, the introduction of the 
new macro-prudential measures may have implications for our forecasts with 
housing supply levels not increasing by as much as expected. 
  
Investment in machinery and equipment generally responds to the same stimuli 
as investment in construction and so this component of investment is also 
forecast to grow. While this is a volatile component, especially due to aircraft 
purchases, the underlying trend is still one of growth.  The continuing low interest 
rate environment should also contribute to growth of 7.7 per cent in 2015, with 
marginally slower growth of just over 6.5 per cent in 2016. Based on growth in 
the component parts, our expectation is that overall investment will grow by 
close to 13 per cent in 2015. Following the strong growth rates of recent years we 
will experience some moderation in investment growth in 2016. However, 
investment growth will remain strong at over 9.5 per cent in volume terms.  
 
Labour Market 
Since the fourth quarter of 2012 there has been a continuous expansion of 
employment and reduction in unemployment in Ireland. These improvements in 
labour market conditions remain one of the most reliable indicators of recovering 
economic activity. The latest Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) for the 
final quarter of 2014 reports an annual increase in employment of 1.5 per cent in 
                                                          
23  Duffy, D., D. Byrne and J. FitzGerald, (2014). “Alternative Scenarios for New Household Formation in Ireland”. Special 
Article, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring 2014. 
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the year to Q4 2014. This compares with an increase of 3.3 per cent in the year to 
Q4 2013. Total employment now stands at its highest level since Q3 2009.  
 
The increase in total employment of 29,100 in the year to Q4 2014 was 
comprised of an increase of 2.7 per cent in full-time employment and a decrease 
in part-time employment of 2.3 per cent. Employment increased in 11 of the 14 
economic sectors over the year and fell in only three (Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing; Public Administration and Defence; and Human Health and Social Work 
Activities). The largest rate of increase was recorded in Construction, up 12.6 per 
cent in the year followed by annual growth of almost 5 per cent in Financial, 
Insurance and Real Estate Activities. It is possible that reductions in the long-term 
unemployment rate over the year are largely driven by the fact that the 
Construction sector is beginning to return to more long-term sustainable levels.  
 
The proportion of total unemployment currently accounted for by long-term 
unemployment stands at 57.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2014. This 
compares to a value of 61.4 per cent recorded 12 months previous and 59.9 per 
cent in Q4 2012. The long-term unemployment rate fell to 5.7 per cent in the 
fourth quarter of 2014 down 1.5 per cent from Q3. The seasonally adjusted 
unemployment rate is now 10.4 per cent which is the lowest recorded rate since 
the Q1 2009 when it stood at 10.2 per cent. Unemployment decreased by 15.6 
per cent in the year. This is the tenth quarter in succession where unemployment 
has declined on an annual basis. 
 
The number of employees in the public sector continued to decline in the fourth 
quarter of 2014 bringing the total reduction in employment in the public sector 
over the three years (Q4 2011 - Q4 2014) to 4.2 per cent. Private sector 
employment continues to remain strong with annual growth in Q4 2014 of 3.2 
per cent compared with the increase of 2.4 per cent recorded in the year to Q4 
2013. 
 
In recent months it has become apparent that the participation rate is failing to 
rise as quickly as anticipated given the sharp fall in unemployment. CSO data 
indicate that this may be influenced by changes within the 15-19 year old age 
group. In Q3 2007 the participation rate within this age group was 33.4 per cent 
of which 35.6 per cent were male. By Q4 2014 this rate had fallen to 15.3 per 
cent. It may be the case that many within this age group returned to education in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis and continue to remain in education even 
with improving labour market conditions. Therefore, we forecast that the 
participation rate will rise marginally in 2015 and 2016. We also forecast that the 
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annual average unemployment rate will be 9.7 per cent in 2015 and 8.4 per cent 
in 2016. Employment growth will continue in both industry and services with 
strong employment growth in Construction likely to continue into 2016. 
 
Public Finances 
A key feature of the improved economic performance of the economy has been 
the strength of the tax take throughout 2014. The end-year Exchequer returns 
show that the public finances performed well in 2014, in line with expectations, 
given the buoyancy of the monthly Exchequer returns and strong growth in the 
economy. Overall taxation receipts increased by over 9 per cent in 2014, with the 
5 per cent increase in pay related social insurance (PRSI) for the same period 
indicating a significant increase in labour market activity. Net voted expenditure 
was down 2 per cent, although this masked an overrun on net current voted 
expenditure as a result of higher health spending. On the basis of these returns, 
we estimate that the general government balance was 3.7 per cent, once again 
well within the target set under the bailout agreement.  
 
The Exchequer returns for February suggest that the growth in tax revenues has 
continued into 2015. Ongoing growth in employment as well as increases in 
personal incomes, improving consumer sentiment and corporate profits should 
underpin growth in tax revenue throughout 2015 and 2016. However, our belief 
remains that it will be difficult to reduce expenditure levels over the forecast 
period. 
 
If our expectations for growth in these variables prove to be correct, then the 
deficit should decline to 2.3 per cent of GDP this year, with a further reduction to 
0.3 per cent in 2016. This represents a significant improvement in the public 
finances particularly when compared with the sizeable deficits incurred in 2010 
and 2011. As stated in the “Output” section above we believe that, given our 
growth forecasts, the Irish economy will be near to its potential level at the end 
of 2015. In that context, if the economy continues to grow significantly in 2016, 
budgetary policy will play an important role in moderating economic activity and 
ensuring that there is no repeat of the destabilising pro-cyclical policy evident in 
the run up to the financial crisis of 2007/08. This may require, for example, that 
budgetary policy targets fiscal surpluses in 2017 and 2018.  
 
As a result of these forecasts, gross debt as a proportion of GDP will fall steadily. 
Having peaked at over 123 per cent of GDP in 2013 we estimate that by the end 
of 2016 gross debt will be the equivalent of 101 per cent.  
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TABLE 4 Public Finances 
 2014 2015 2015 2016 2016 
 €bn €bn % change €bn % change 
Income      
Taxes on income incl. Social insurance 31.8 33.5 5.2 36.2 8.2 
Taxes on expenditure 20.9 21.1 1.3 22.0 4.1 
Gross trading and investment income 3.3 3.1 -6.7 3.1 0.0 
Other Income 3.1 3.2 1.9 3.2 0.0 
Total receipts: Current 59.2 61.0 3.0 64.5 5.9 
Total receipts: Capital 0.6 0.7 15.6 0.7 0.0 
Total receipts: Current and Capital 59.8 61.7 3.1 65.3 5.8 
Expenditure      
Subsidies 1.6 1.8 16.0 1.9 1.9 
National debt interest 7.5 7.1 -5.0 6.8 -4.2 
Transfer payments 27.8 27.4 -1.5 27.0 -1.5 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 26.1 26.5 1.2 26.8 1.3 
Total expenditure: Current 63.0 62.8 -0.4 62.5 -0.5 
Total expenditure: Capital 3.7 3.4 -7.0 3.5 1.5 
Total expenditure: Current and Capital    66.7 66.2 -0.7 65.9 -0.4 
General Govt. Balance -6.8 -4.5  -0.6  
As % of GDP -3.7 -2.3  -0.3  
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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General Assessment 
 
At 5.2 per cent, the Irish economy experienced the most significant rate of 
growth across the Euro Area in 2014. The strong recovery in economic activity is 
set to continue into 2015 where we forecast both GNP and GDP to grow by 
approximately 4.1 and 4.4 per cent respectively. Whereas most of the growth up 
to the mid-point of last year was heavily dependent on external demand, 
domestic investment, in particular, and consumption to a lesser extent are now 
playing a more prominent role in overall performance.  
 
Notwithstanding the increasing contribution of domestic sources of growth, the 
performance of key foreign markets continues to be essential for any positive 
Irish outlook. In that regard some recent research and analysis is of particular 
interest. The annual report from the Euroframe group24 expects a relatively 
strong performance in Ireland’s export destinations of the US and UK markets in 
2015, with rates of growth of 3.2 and 2.8 per cent envisaged respectively. Using a 
coherent international modelling framework, the report also examines the 
implications of an oil price shock. The results, which are commented on more 
extensively in the “International Economy” section of the Commentary, suggest 
that output growth in the OECD could be increased by 1 per cent in 2015 and half 
a per cent in 2016 due to lower prices.25 
 
As the first Commentary of the year, we also release our initial forecast for 2016. 
In framing a more medium-term outlook, it is useful to examine the productive 
capacity of the Irish economy given the recent strong performance. Using the 
growth accounting framework presented in Byrne and McQuinn (2014) and 
McQuinn and Whelan (2015), this suggests that, particularly given the relatively 
strong outlook for 2015, the Irish economy is set to be almost at its potential level 
by the end of 2015. Certainly, key parameters such as the investment rate and 
total factor productivity growth will be at, or slightly above, their long-run median 
values by the end of 2015, leaving only the unemployment rate still divergent 
from its equivalent long-run rate. Based on this, we forecast a growth rate in GNP 
in 2016 of 3.5 per cent. Associated with this is our forecast, under the assumption 
of fiscal neutrality, of a deficit in 2016 of 0.3 per cent. 
A significant policy development in Q1 2015 was the decision in January by the 
ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem to instigate a programme 
                                                          
24  Available online at http://www.euroframe.org/. 
25  This is under the assumption that the fall in oil prices is a permanent decline. 
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which will purchase €60 billion in securities each month until the end of 
September 2016 at the earliest (cumulatively €1.114 trillion in purchases). The 
majority of the purchases will be of national sovereign bonds. Overall, while QE is 
unlikely to trigger much growth in bank lending across the Euro Area, it should 
have a number of positive effects. For example, the yields on sovereign bonds is 
likely to be lowered, thereby reducing further the costs of borrowing for Euro 
Area governments. Arguably, more important is the impact QE will have on 
inflation expectations. It signals the intention of the ECB to get inflation back to 
its target of 2 per cent. By raising inflation expectations, it should lead the way to 
increases in actual inflation - something very much needed across Europe at this 
time. 
 
Despite the relatively positive domestic outlook for this and next year, there are a 
number of downside risks which we would note. 
 
While there has been a recent minor improvement in the European growth 
outlook, the medium and longer-term performance is of continued significant 
concern. The Research Note 2015/1/2 by McQuinn and Whelan summarises a 
new research paper entitled “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and 
Without Structural Reforms”.26 The work takes a Solow growth model and derives 
long-run growth forecasts for the Euro Area using standard assumptions. A 
number of key results arise from the analysis; the first is the finding that the 
impending change in the demographic structure of the European population has 
significant implications for future growth prospects. At present the proportion of 
the European population in the key 15 to 64 age category is 64 per cent; however 
by 2040, according to EuroStat, this will have fallen to 56 per cent. This will lead 
to a significant decline in the growth rate of labour supply across the continent.  
 
In a baseline scenario McQuinn and Whelan believe that output growth in the 
Euro Area will average just 0.7 per cent per annum between 2014 and 2020. They 
also assess the implications for growth of a significant collection of structural 
reforms in the labour market and for total factor productivity. Even with the 
successful application of an ambitious set of reforms, the baseline growth rate 
would be improved by just 1 per cent per annum. The research concludes by 
calling for a significant joint Euro Area funded capital investment programme, 
which would address the large output gap and increase the supply-side potential 
of the European economy.  
                                                          
26  McQuinn K. and K. Whelan (2015). “Europe’s Long-Term Growth Prospects: With and Without Structural Reforms”, 
ESRI and UCD, forthcoming. 
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Such a relatively weak medium and longer-term outlook for the European 
economy has clear policy implications from an Irish perspective.  Over the longer-
term, McQuinn and Whelan (2014) argue that, in the case of Europe, a return to 
higher rates of migration may be necessary if European authorities wish to keep 
the future supply of labour growing. While the demographic pressures 
confronting certain European countries are more acute than those likely to 
transpire in Ireland, an expansion of the Irish labour force over the longer period 
of time will also require sizeable future inward migration. In the more short to 
medium-term, the analysis has implications for the export strategies adopted by 
firms in the Irish economy. The relatively weak European outlook indicates that 
ongoing policies to increase the diversity of potential export destinations should 
be reinforced; increasing efforts should continue to target regions and economies 
with younger populations and, as a result, more dynamic growth prospects. 
Finally, the results underscore the importance of continued improvements in 
both domestic labour and total factor productivity in securing future sustainable 
rates of economic growth. 
 
Ongoing developments in the Irish housing market also continue to warrant some 
concern. In January the Central Bank of Ireland outlined its finalised proposals for 
macro-prudential measures aimed at preventing future unsustainable house price 
movements. In forthcoming research, Duffy, McInerney and McQuinn27 analyse 
the implications of these measures for the Irish mortgage and property market 
given the current state of both markets. At present, the Irish property and credit 
market is still emerging from the complete market failure which pertained 
between 2007 and 2012. Housing supply is somewhat below fundamental levels, 
based on underlying structural demand, while growth rates in mortgage lending 
are still negative. Furthermore, house prices have increased significantly since 
early 2013, against the backdrop of a 50 per cent fall in prices between 2007 and 
2012. This period, almost inevitably, saw actual prices fall below the level which 
would have been suggested by the state of fundamental variables in the 
economy. 
The results in Duffy, McInerney and McQuinn indicate that, while the macro-
prudential measures proposed will more than likely result in house prices being 
lower than they otherwise would be, they may also result in fewer houses being 
supplied to the market and fewer mortgage loans being issued than a “baseline” 
or no policy change scenario. As a result, as noted by Whelan,28 the measures 
may well end up curbing house price inflation but at the cost of generating a sub-
                                                          
27  Duffy D., N. McInerney and K. McQuinn (2015). “Macro-Prudential Policy in a Recovering Housing Market: Too Much 
Too Soon?” ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
28  Whelan, K. (2014). “The Central Bank and the Property Market”. Blog post. Available at www.karlwhelan.com. 
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optimal equilibrium in the housing market. In this market the measures result in 
restricted demand for new houses, while the supply-side response is impaired by 
credit and other regulatory restrictions. 
 
An additional issue which may also arise from the macro-prudential measures is 
further upward pressure on Irish rental levels. There is some evidence from the 
international literature to support the view that the presence of additional credit 
constraints in the mortgage market may result in rental rates increasing vis-à-vis 
house prices. Certain rental rates in the domestic market, as noted in the 
Commentary, are already now approaching their pre-financial crisis peak. 
 
 
 Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A1 Exports of Goods and Services 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 91.8 16.4 17.2 106.8 7.9 7.0 115.2 6.0 5.2 122.2 
Tourism 3.4 8.7 7.0 3.7 5.1 3.4 3.8 5.0 3.4 4.0 
Other Services 88.9 9.4 8.0 97.3 4.4 3.0 101.6 5.1 3.6 106.8 
Exports Of Goods and Services 184.1 12.9 12.6 207.8 6.2 5.1 220.7 5.6 4.5 233.0 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Exports 184.1 12.9 12.6 207.8 6.2 5.1 220.7 5.6 4.5 233.0 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.2 18.7 15.0 3.8 16.9 13.3 4.5 11.5 8.0 5.0 
Other Building 7.3 6.6 3.6 7.7 21.8 18.3 9.4 19.5 15.8 11.3 
Transfer Costs 0.5 6.0 2.9 0.5 13.3 10.0 0.6 13.3 10.0 0.7 
Building and Construction 11.0 10.1 8.8 12.1 19.9 14.4 14.5 16.8 13.2 17.0 
Machinery and Equipment 15.5 15.4 13.0 17.9 13.7 11.3 20.4 8.8 6.6 22.2 
Total Investment 26.5 14.5 11.3 30.4 14.8 12.5 34.9 12.1 9.2 39.1 
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FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn % € bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 3.0 2.5 0.1 3.1 2.5 0.1 3.2 2.5 0.1 3.3 
Non-Agricultural Wages 71.9 1.8 1.3 73.1 4.0 2.9 76.1 4.0 3.0 79.1 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 15.2 22.8 3.5 18.6 13.4 2.5 21.1 11.2 2.4 23.5 
Total Income Received 90.1 5.3 4.8 94.9 5.8 5.5 100.4 5.4 5.5 105.8 
Current Transfers 24.5 -0.9 -0.2 24.3 -2.3 -0.6 23.7 -2.1 -0.5 23.2 
Gross Personal Income 114.6 4.0 4.6 119.2 4.1 4.9 124.1 4.0 5.0 129.1 
Direct Personal Taxes 25.3 5.6 1.4 26.7 4.7 1.2 28.0 7.7 2.2 30.1 
Personal Disposable Income 89.3 3.6 3.2 92.5 4.0 3.7 96.2 2.9 2.8 99.0 
Consumption 83.3 2.7 2.3 85.6 3.6 3.1 88.7 3.9 3.5 92.2 
Personal Savings 5.9 15.3 0.9 6.8 8.6 0.6 7.4 -9.1 -0.7 6.7 
Savings Ratio 6.6 
  
7.4 
  
7.7   6.8 
Average Personal Tax Rate 22.0 
  
22.3 
  
22.4   23.2 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4 Imports of Goods and Services  
 
2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 % change in 2016 2016 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 55.6 9.6 8.8 60.9 7.5 7.2 65.5 8.2 7.4 70.8 
Tourism 4.7 0.6 1.2 4.7 4.2 1.2 4.9 4.9 1.8 5.1 
Other Services 87.4 3.2 2.8 102.5 3.1 2.8 105.6 2.9 2.9 108.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.7 13.8 0.0 168.1 4.7 0.0 176.0 4.9 0.0 184.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.0 
  
0.0 
  
0.0   0.0 
Adjusted Imports 147.7 13.8 13.2 168.1 4.7 4.4 176.0 4.9 4.6 184.7 
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FORECAST TABLE A5 Balance of Payments 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 184.1 207.8 220.7 233.0 
Imports of Goods and Services 147.7 168.1 176.0 184.7 
Net Factor Payments -27.3 -27.0 -28.9 -30.6 
Net Transfers -2.5 -2.3 -2.4 -2.5 
Balance on Current Account 6.6 10.5 13.4 15.2 
As a % of GNP 4.5 6.6 7.9 8.5 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6 Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 107 109 106 106 
Industry 343 348 368 382 
Of which: Construction 102 109 118 125 
Services 1,431 1,453 1,490 1,531 
Total at Work 1,880 1,914 1,964 2,019 
Unemployed 282 243 212 185 
Labour Force 2,163 2,157 2,176 2,204 
Unemployment Rate, % 13.1 11.3 9.7 8.4 
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Nowcasting Appendix 
 
Introduction 
A recent QEC Research Note29 outlined the introduction of the “nowcasting” 
methodology to the suite of forecasting models used at the ESRI. Nowcasting 
allows forecasters to produce estimates of economic growth at short-term 
horizons. The growth estimates are based on a large panel of indicators which are 
predominantly at monthly frequency, with the movements in these giving an 
early estimate of quarterly growth.  For this Spring Commentary, estimates have 
been produced for the first and second quarters of 2015. The estimate for Q1 
2015 is termed a nowcast, i.e. growth in the current calendar quarter, while the 
estimate for Q2 2015 is a forecast. 
 
The nowcasting model uses approximately 50 indicators. These include, for 
instance, Quarterly National Accounts data for Ireland and its main trading 
partners, Industrial Production and Turnover, Labour Market data, Purchasing 
Managers’ Indices (PMIs) for Services and Manufacturing, Retail Sales, Goods 
Exports and Imports, Private Sector Credit, Exchequer Returns and Consumer 
Sentiment Indices. 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows the nowcast and forecast of GDP growth in Q1 and Q2 with 
confidence intervals included. The nowcasting methodology also allows the 
marginal impact on the quarterly growth estimate of a movement in an individual 
series to be calculated. For example, Industrial Production and Turnover in 
January 2015 lowered the nowcast estimate by 25 basis points suggesting that 
developments in this indicator lowered the growth rate in GDP for that quarter, 
while the February Services PMI for Ireland increased the estimate by 12 basis 
points. 
TABLE 1 Current Nowcast and Forecast of Irish Quarter-on-Quarter GDP Growth Rates 
Period Nature of Estimate GDP Estimate % 95% Confidence Interval 
Q1 2015 Nowcast 1.26 -0.27 2.78 
Q2 2015 Forecast 0.98 -0.63 2.60 
Source:  Own estimates. 
                                                          
29  Byrne, D., C. Morley and K. McQuinn (2014), “Nowcasting and the Need for Timely Estimates of Movements in Irish 
Output”.  Research Note 2014/3/1, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn 2014. 
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Figure 1 shows the evolution of the growth estimates through the first three 
months of 2015. A new GDP growth estimate is produced as each of the 
indicators in the panel is updated throughout the quarter (so, for example, if an 
update of a particular series becomes available on the 12th of February, an 
estimate of GDP growth is then produced based on this and the other series 
already available at that date). Figure 1 shows the progression of “forward 
quarter” estimate, which is the average of the nowcast and forecast. Overall, 
based on this approach, it would indicate that the economy is growing by 
approximately 1 per cent in Q1 2015 with respect to Q4 2014. 
 
FIGURE 1 Progression of GDP Growth Estimates During Q1 2015 
 
 
Source:  Own estimates. 
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The Irish Electricity Market: New Regulation 
to Preserve Competition 
 
* Valeria di Cosmo and Muireann Á. Lynch30 
1. Introduction 
In the electricity sector there are two different markets: the wholesale (or spot) 
market, in which electricity generators generate and sell electricity at a new price 
every half hour, and the retail market, in which electricity supply companies sell 
electricity to the final consumers. Supply companies tend not to change the price 
they charge their consumers very frequently, and so these companies typically 
enter into longer-term contracts for electricity with generators to avoid the risks 
they would face if they bought at a new price every half hour. Internationally, 
many electricity markets also include a specific capacity payment mechanism, 
which ensures generators receive sufficient revenue to cover their fixed costs, 
thereby incentivising investment. 
 
The Single Electricity Market (SEM) of the island of Ireland has been in place since 
2007. The market takes the form of a centrally-traded pool where all electricity is 
bought and sold. In 2014, the payments made to generators for the electricity 
they provided came to €2.2 billion and capacity payments came to €556 million.31 
Since the SEM was launched, wholesale electricity prices have tracked input fuel 
prices closely and the costs and bids of generators have been open and 
transparent.  
 
The European Union is working to harmonise electricity markets in its Member 
States by specifying a Target Model for electricity markets across Europe. The 
SEM has some technical features that render it incompatible with the European 
Target Model and so a number of changes to the market are necessary.32 The 
SEM will therefore be replaced by a new Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-
SEM), which will be Target-Model compatible, by 2017. The new market will 
                                                          
30  Di Cosmo acknowledges funding from Science Foundation Ireland, Grant No. 09/SRC/E1780. Lynch is funded by the 
Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions and is co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF). Thanks to Sean Lyons for comments on a previous draft. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the 
authors. 
31   See http://www.sem-o.com/pages/MDB_ValueOfMarket.aspx for full details. 
32  The rationale behind the Target Model is to promote efficient trading of energy between different countries. This 
includes allowing the cheapest generators to meet demand at each point in time while respecting their technical 
constraints, enhancing security of supply in each market, and facilitating the integration of renewable generation. 
 
* Valeria.diCosmo@esri.ie; Muireann.Lynch@esri.ie ESRI Research Notes 2015/1/1 
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affect the spot and retail markets and the mechanisms through which supply 
companies buy electricity in advance to manage their risks.33 We have concerns 
about some possible undesired consequences of the new market design for the I-
SEM, relating to both spot and retail markets. There are also proposed changes to 
the capacity payment mechanism which are of concern. 
 
Traditionally, electricity was generated and supplied to final consumers by state-
owned monopolies. In the past two decades, electricity markets worldwide have 
been liberalised, with many players competing in both generation and retail 
markets. Often, however, the legacy monopolist retains a large market share in 
generation and retail markets. The SEM is no exception.  
 
The legacy monopolist in the SEM has both a generation and a retail arm. Thus, 
one firm owns a large amount of the generation units on the system, provides a 
large proportion of total power generated and has the largest number of retail 
consumers. This allows the firm, in theory, to hide the true costs in each market 
by passing costs between its retail and generation arms. The legacy monopolist 
therefore has the potential to influence prices in both wholesale and retail 
markets. Any redesign of the SEM should take these structural issues, namely a 
low number of players and a dominant firm, into account. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the challenges facing the 
new I-SEM in spot and retail markets. Section 3 analyses the risks associated with 
the new capacity mechanism and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Market Power in Spot and Retail Markets: the Role of Forward Markets 
Both theoretical literature and international experience suggest that in order to 
promote competition in electricity markets with a small number of players, three 
measures may be employed. The first is where generators are required to base 
their bids on their true costs, and the regulator closely monitors spot market 
prices. The second is to improve the links between local and international 
electricity markets (this is achieved by building interconnectors). The final option 
is to incentivise local generators to commit to sell electricity at a competitive 
price in advance (this is achieved with a liquid forward market).34 These options 
should not be seen as exclusive, as they can successfully be integrated. In 
particular, a liquid forward market can also prevent the retail price, which 
                                                          
33  See Directive 2009/72/EC on common rules for internal market and Regulation 713/2009/EC for coordination in the 
Single European Market. 
34   See Di Cosmo and Lynch (2015) for more details. 
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represents the ultimate cost to consumers, from rising in the long term, as we will 
discuss below. 
 
Competition in the current SEM spot market is currently ensured primarily 
through the first of these options, namely by regulating and monitoring spot 
market bids. This efficiently prevents generators from setting prices which do not 
reflect their true costs. This is achieved by the so called "Bidding Code of 
Practice", which legally requires generators to declare (or bid) their short-run 
marginal costs. This is the cost of producing one extra unit of electricity, and 
therefore is directly linked to generators’ costs of fuel and carbon. These short-
run marginal costs are bid separately from all other costs, such as the costs of 
starting or running the plant without producing electricity. Instead, generators 
include start costs and running costs in separate bids. Generators are also 
required to bid these other costs truthfully. 
 
In the I-SEM, a new bidding structure will be used, which will bring new 
challenges to the Irish electricity market. In particular, it will no longer be possible 
to declare the different components of generation costs (start costs, running 
costs and short-run marginal costs) separately. This may weaken the link between 
generators’ costs and market prices, and will also increase the responsibility 
generators must bear for ensuring their generation schedules are such that all 
their running costs are met. This new responsibility for meeting all costs may 
necessitate extra payments to generators. Furthermore it will be more difficult, 
but not impossible, for the regulatory bodies to impose conditions on the bids 
generators make in the new market, as they do at present. Given these 
limitations, in order to maintain the competitive spot market prices seen to date, 
we recommend that generators’ bids be monitored carefully by the regulatory 
authorities to prevent them from exhibiting strategic behaviour. 
 
Interconnection is the second of the three mechanisms through which 
competition is promoted. If there is a good level of interconnection between 
countries, generators compete not only within their country, but also with 
generators in other countries. In this case the number of market players is likely 
to be high enough to promote competition and, by extension, to keep electricity 
prices at their competitive level (which is the lowest level achievable). Although 
the efficient use of interconnectors will be beneficial for competition, the 
potential benefits and costs associated with higher interconnection levels may 
deserve further analysis. 
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The Irish market will be interconnected with the UK market, but not directly with 
Europe. As the UK market cannot be considered completely integrated with the 
rest of the European markets (i.e. the prices in the two zones won't necessarily 
always be the same), the existing interconnection is unlikely to open the Irish 
market to other EU players. Moreover, some companies in the UK are also 
owners of electricity companies in the Irish market, and this may reduce the 
benefits in terms of competition which can be gained through interconnection. 
Therefore the potential for interconnection to act as a means of ensuring 
competition in the new I-SEM, as with the current SEM, is limited. 
 
Forward markets are the third measure often used to promote competition in 
electricity markets. In forward markets, generators commit to sell electricity in 
advance at a certain price. However, forward markets are also unlikely to 
underpin effective competition in Ireland, because the SEM is probably too small 
to support a liquid financial forward market. More realistically, the main forward 
contracts in this market will be bilateral contracts between generators and 
suppliers. Nevertheless, forward markets could still contribute to competition in 
I-SEM if they are properly designed. In particular, forward markets should be 
transparent, with the forward prices emerging from bilateral contracts made 
public. 
 
If forward prices are made public, suppliers that earn high profits (which, in turn, 
will be associated with high retail prices) can be easily detected. This will provide 
a signal for new companies to enter the retail market and take advantage of the 
high profit margins. Furthermore, given the availability of such information on 
prices and suppliers, consumers can switch supplier and secure the best price. 
The regulator should facilitate such switching by ensuring there is sufficient 
information available to consumers. In particular, the regulator should require 
supply companies to publish all details of the components of the tariffs they 
applied to consumers who are not willing to switch their provider.35 Extra 
consumer charges to subsidise renewable generators should also be published 
separately. 
 
In summary, there are several challenges the I-SEM design encounters: it must 
keep spot prices at the lowest level achievable and ensure that supply companies 
transfer this price to final consumers, without earning extra profits. The low level 
                                                          
35   These include the price at which the electricity was bought (either on the forward or spot market) and the costs of 
billing and metering. The focus on information and the role of the regulatory authority is particularly important, as 
recent economic theories highlight that consumers who are offered sufficient choice between plans sometimes do 
not select products that maximise their best interests.  Wilson and Waddams (2010) used survey data from the UK 
electricity market and found that 20-32 per cent of consumers who switched supplier in order to obtain cheaper 
electricity actually ended up paying more, while less than 20 per cent switched to the firm offering the highest saving. 
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of interconnection and the lack of a liquid forward market may prevent the I-SEM 
from delivering an efficient price. Therefore, it seems regulation is the best way 
to ensure a competitive final price for consumers.  
 
In particular, regulation should monitor the quantity and the price of the forward 
contracts in order to ensure that forward sales are at a reasonable price.36 On the 
retail side, the regulator should require supply companies to publish the 
components of their tariffs, enabling consumers to make an informed decision 
when choosing supplier and to encourage new entrants if retail margins are high. 
 
3. New Capacity Payment Mechanism 
Capacity payments are payments made to generators to cover the fixed costs of 
the plant, as revenues from the sale of energy may not prove sufficient to ensure 
an appropriate level of investment arises. At present, capacity is paid for by 
dividing a capacity “pot”, the size of which is determined by the regulatory 
authorities, among all available generators. This mechanism will be replaced by a 
reliability options mechanism in the I-SEM.  
 
In a reliability options framework, generators participate in a competitive auction 
to hold reliability options in a given year. The total amount of options sold in the 
auction is equal to the estimated maximum level of electricity demand for the 
year. Thus consumers pay generators to hold reliability options, and in return 
receive assurance that there will be sufficient generation plants installed on the 
system to meet the maximum demand.  
 
Generators that hold reliability options can be called upon by the Transmission 
System Operator (TSO - i.e. the System Operator of Northern Ireland or EirGrid) 
to generate at periods of system stress. These are identified as periods when spot 
prices rise above a “strike price” which will be predetermined by a central 
regulating body and announced in advance of the reliability option auction. In 
these circumstances, generators holding reliability options are required to repay 
the difference between the market price and the strike price to the TSO. This 
shields consumers from the effects of high spot prices. Reliability options have 
been implemented in the New England electricity market and are proposed for 
the Italian market. 
 
                                                          
36    See Di Cosmo and Lynch (2015) for more details. 
46  |  Q ua rt er ly  Eco no m ic  C omme nt ary  –  S p r i ng  20 15  
There is a danger that if the total amount of options cannot be sold without the 
participation of one particular firm, this firm will have both the ability and 
incentive to bid a high price for holding these options, which will lead to the 
auction clearing at a high price. The current capacity payment mechanism was 
not vulnerable to this exercise of market power, as the regulatory bodies 
determined the capacity pot. Therefore firms could not cause total capacity 
payments to rise through strategic behaviour. 
 
The regulators remain confident that appropriate measures can be identified to 
mitigate this potential strategic bidding which can be implemented along with the 
move to reliability options. However, there is no examination in the academic 
literature to date of the interaction of reliability options with a dominant firm or a 
low number of players. Indeed, much of the literature specifically ignores such 
issues when examining reliability options. These structural issues, which are 
present in the SEM, do not hold in other markets operating such capacity 
payment mechanisms.  
 
Given this background, the authors are of the view that the only feasible way to 
protect consumers from the exercise of market power in the capacity market is to 
regulate prices. The regulator should perform a pivotal supplier test every year, 
which ascertains whether there is one firm without which the total allocation of 
options cannot be sold. If such a pivotal supplier is found, the price and quantity 
bid into the reliability options auction by every unit owned by the pivotal supplier 
should be regulated.37 However, this would lead to the regulatory bodies 
determining not only the demand, but also a large portion of the supply curve of 
capacity in the I-SEM. Such a regulatory regime would also prove a significant 
administrative burden for the regulatory authorities. Finally, it could lead to a risk 
of litigation. 
 
One final question regarding reliability options relates to wind generation, which 
is of increasing importance in the SEM. At present, the capacity payment pot is 
divided amongst all available generators, including wind generators. The revenue 
wind generators receive from the capacity payment mechanism is taken into 
account when determining the subsidy to which wind generators are entitled.  
 
Under the new regime it is unlikely that wind generators will hold many if any 
reliability options, as periods of system stress may not coincide with positive wind 
output. Wind generators will therefore be reluctant to participate in the auction 
                                                          
37   Similar practices exist in other jurisdiction, see for example  
http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20130826142258-Staff%20Paper.pdf. 
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at a low price, and are unlikely to hold these options. Thus, in determining 
whether a reliability options framework represents a net benefit for the 
consumer compared with the current regime, the total cost of the current 
mechanism should be compared with the cost of the new mechanism plus any 
addition to wind subsidies caused by the loss of capacity payments to wind 
generators. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The design of the Integrated Single Electricity Market raises concerns about the 
potential to realise a competitive outcome in the spot market, the retail market 
and the capacity market. The capability of forward trading to mitigate these risks 
is limited due to the nature of the Irish market. In a small market with limited 
interconnection capacity, liquid and transparent forward markets are unlikely to 
develop.  
 
Therefore we recommend that the dominant firm face regulation of its forward 
sales and also the prices and quantities it bids into the new capacity payment 
mechanism. Furthermore spot market prices and retail prices should be closely 
monitored and regulation of retail tariffs, by means of a default tariff, should be 
considered.  
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Demographics and the Growth Outlook for 
Europe 
 
 
* Kieran McQuinn and Karl Whelan38 
1. Introduction 
With low inflation in the Euro Area taken as a given, a return to steady real GDP 
growth is likely to be the most effective mechanism for restoring Europe’s highly 
indebted governments, businesses and households to sustainable situations. This 
paper examines prospects for growth in the Eurozone. It follows up on an earlier 
paper of ours (McQuinn and Whelan, 2008) that focused on trends up to mid-
2006. While the period of growth in Europe prior to the global crisis of 2008 is 
sometimes referred to as “the boom”, our previous paper had noted that long-
run trends in both productivity and per capita hours worked were deteriorating 
to the point where potential output growth in the Euro Area was at a historical 
low point and apparently on a negative trend. After a long period of catching up 
with US levels of labour productivity, Euro Area productivity growth had, from the 
mid-1990s onwards, fallen significantly behind. 
 
In this paper, we update our calculations from our 2008 paper and provide 
projections of Eurozone growth out to 2060, based on recovery scenarios and 
long-term demographic trends. Because of data restrictions, we restrict our 
analysis to the twelve countries that participated in the Euro Area prior to the 
most recent accessions.39 
 
                                                          
38  Whelan is professor of economics at UCD. The authors would like to thank all those who participated at the second 
CSPR-Modena conference on growth in mature economies for comments on an earlier draft. Any remaining errors 
are the responsibility of the authors. 
39  These are Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Finland, Austria, Greece 
and Italy. 
* kieran.mcquinn@esri.ie; Karl.Whelan@ucd.ie ESRI Research Notes 2015/1/2 
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Overall, our findings are sobering for those expecting economic growth to deal 
with the Euro Area’s debt problems over the next decade. Among the results we 
report are the following:  
1. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth in the Euro Area has almost ground 
to a halt: it averaged 0.2 per cent per year over the period 2000-2013. 
2. The ongoing slump in investment is having negative supply-side effects: 
low capital stock growth is subtracting about 0.6 per cent per year from 
potential output growth. 
3. The working age (15 to 64) population of the Euro Area has been 
declining since 2010. 
4. We project real GDP growth of less than half of one per cent over the 
next decade even if unemployment and investment return to their pre-
crisis rates by 2020. 
 
2. Growth Accounting Framework 
The analytical framework which we use to assess the performance of European 
countries is similar to that outlined in Byrne and McQuinn (2014) and is based 
on the standard assumption that output is produced according to a Cobb-
Douglas production function 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 
where 𝑌𝑡 is real output, 𝐾𝑡 is capital input, 𝐿𝑡 is labour input (defined in this 
paper as total hours worked), and 𝐴𝑡 is Total Factor Productivity. Output growth 
can then be expressed as 
𝑌?̇?
𝑌𝑡
= 𝐴?̇?
𝐴𝑡
+ α𝐾?̇?
𝐾𝑡
+ (1 −  α) 𝐿?̇?
𝐿𝑡
 
Using data on output growth, capital growth and labour growth, TFP growth can 
be calculated. As there is no official capital stock series for the European 
economy, we construct this series ourselves. To do this we assume that the initial 
stock of capital in 1970 equals the steady-state value implied by the Solow 
growth model in this year based on the trends at that point for GDP growth, the 
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investment share of GDP and the growth rate of labour input. The rest of the 
capital stock series is then derived using the following definition 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 −  𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 
with a depreciation rate of six per cent per annum. For more on the assumptions 
underpinning the growth calculations see McQuinn and Whelan (2007) and 
McQuinn and Whelan (2008).40 
 
3. Historical Assessment and Likely Future Trends in TFP and Labour Supply 
Table 1 presents results for the Euro Area and the US of the growth accounting 
exercise which allocates output growth according to its three components. 
Amongst the trends to emerge from the table is the declining rate of TFP 
growth. Euro Area TFP growth was running at 2.7 per cent in the first half of the 
1970s, fell to 1.6 per cent over 1977-1986, to 1.5 per cent over 1987-1996 and 
to 0.7 per cent over 1997-2006. The period from 2007-2013 has seen TFP 
decline at an average rate of 0.2 per cent per year, mainly due to a 3 per cent 
decline in 2009. In terms of assessing likely future trends in Euro Area TFP, we 
believe that the average growth rate over the period 2000-2013 of 0.2 per cent 
may well represent a reasonable value for the medium-term growth rate. This 
period incorporated a number of years of expansion and falling unemployment 
as well as two periods of rising unemployment so the total cyclical effect on this 
average is probably quite low. 
 
We now turn to labour market developments in the Euro Area. Labour 
productivity and hours worked together determine the path of GDP in any 
economy. Table 2 provides a decomposition of the percentage change in total 
hours worked as a function of four different components: changes in population, 
the participation rate (labour force divided by the total population), the 
employment rate (employment as a fraction of the labour force) and the change 
in average work week per employee. Figure 1 provides graphical evidence of 
related variables. It shows that in the period since 1970, European population 
growth has fluctuated around a relatively low average value of about half of one 
                                                          
40  All of the data, with the exception of the average work week is taken from the European Commission AMECO 
database. Data on the work week is taken from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC): 
www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/. 
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per cent and has gradually fallen over the past decade. Rising female labour 
force participation has driven a significant increase in the fraction of the 
population that is available for work but this series has levelled off in recent 
years. Offsetting the longer-term rise in participation, the average work week 
has declined steadily and unemployment rates have risen to a much higher 
average value than those recorded in the early 1970s. 
 
Rather than focus in detail on the factors that have driven past fluctuations in 
labour input, we want to focus on the outlook for the future. A number of 
patterns are now in place that point against significant increases in total hours 
worked in the Euro Area economy in the next few decades. 
1. The population of the Euro Area 12 group of countries is expected to 
grow very slowly over the next few decades. Eurostat projections show 
0.18 per cent per year growth in population between 2013 and 2023 
followed by a gradual reduction in population growth until population 
levels begin declining in 2046 (see Figure 2). 
2. More seriously, Eurostat estimate that the Euro Area’s population in the 
normal working-age bracket of 15 to 64 years old peaked in 2010 and is 
set to decline steadily over the next few decades. Eurostat project that 
the population in the 15 to 64 years old bracket will fall at an average 
annual rate of 0.21 per cent in the decade finishing in 2023 and then fall 
at a rate of 0.48 per cent per year in the subsequent decade. 
3. Among those who are in the working-age bracket of 15 to 64 years old, 
the increase in participation rates has gradually tailed off in recent years. 
This represents female labour force participation reaching a plateau in 
many countries but also the effects of population ageing. Participation 
rates fall off as people get closer to the “official” retirement age so the 
ageing of Europe’s population is likely to limit further gains in the 
participation rate.  
4. There is also no evidence, as of yet, that the trend decline in the average 
work week is about to end.  
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4.  Longer-Run Outlook 
How are these trends likely to shape economic growth in the coming decades? 
Here, we report results from a simulation of a simple supply-side model that 
projects growth using recent trends for TFP, uses the demographic projections 
just described and also assumes an unwinding of the cyclical problems with low 
investment and high unemployment. Everything up to 2013 is taken from 
historical data, so 2014 is the first year of the simulation. The model’s ingredients 
are described as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡𝛼𝐿𝑡1−𝛼 
𝐾𝑡 = (1 −  𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑡−1 
𝐿𝑡 = (1 −  𝑢𝑡)(𝑝𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑡)  ×  𝐻𝑡  
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡𝑌𝑡 
∆ log𝐴𝑡 = 𝑔 
 
The evolution of each country’s capital stock depends on last period’s rate of 
investment which we project as a time-varying ratio of total real GDP. Labour 
input is modelled as a product of the country’s employment rate (1 - 𝑢𝑡), the 
participation rate for those in the work-age population, (𝑝𝑡), the working age 
population, (𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑡) and the average length of the work week (𝐻𝑡). The 
assumptions underlying the simulation are as follows: 
1. TFP growth is assumed to continue to grow at the Euro Area 2000-2013 
average of 0.2 per cent. 
2.  The ratio of investment to GDP is projected to recover to its 1998-2007 
average by 2020 and remain constant thereafter. 
3. The unemployment rate is projected to fall gradually to their 1998-2007 
averages by 2020 and be constant thereafter.  
4. European participation rates of work-age population remains at 2013 
levels.  
5. The average work week continues to change over the period 2014 to 
2020 at the same rate as the 2000 to 2013 average and then stays flat. 
6.  The work-age population follows Eurostat projections. 
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Figures 3 and 4 provide graphic illustrations of how our assumptions translate 
into Euro Area aggregate labour market outcomes. The reduction in the 
unemployment rate leads to a temporary increase in total employment up to 
2020 before demographic patterns reassert themselves and produce a gradual 
decline in employment from there onwards. Our projected decline in the average 
work week, however, undoes the positive effect of rising employment so that 
total hours worked declines by about 1.6 per cent in the decade ending in 2023. 
Figure 5 illustrates the assumptions for TFP growth and the investment share of 
GDP with the Euro Area assumed to move towards its average investment rate of 
the period 1998-2007. 
 
Putting these figures together, we project that output per hour will grow at an 
average rate of 0.54 per cent over the period 2014-2023 while GDP will grow at 
an average rate of only 0.38 per cent per year because of declining hours worked 
(see Figure 6). After this decade, output per hour is projected to grow in the 
subsequent decades at average rates of 0.68 per cent in 2024-2033 (declining 
employment leads to a temporary boost via a capital deepening effect), 0.5 per 
cent in 2034-2043, and 0.4 per cent in 2044-2053 as this rate gradually eases 
towards its steady-state value of 0.3 per cent. With falling hours worked, Euro 
Area GDP grows at 0.18 per cent per year in 2023-2033. The decline in hours 
growth tails off in subsequent decades, thus allowing total GDP growth to settle 
down at about 0.25 per cent per year despite declining productivity growth. 
 
5. Concluding Comments 
Despite the need for the Euro Area to return to faster rates of economic growth 
to deal with severe balance sheet problems affecting many of its members, the 
current set of supply-side trends are not at all encouraging for the growth 
prospects over the medium- and long-term. TFP growth is very poor, investment 
is low and demographic problems are going to restrain the growth of labour input 
in the coming years. Combined with a series of demand-side problems, such as 
tight fiscal policy and restrictions on bank credit, the prospects for the Euro Area 
economy over the next decade do not look so good.  
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Indeed, even allowing for a return of investment and unemployment to pre-crisis 
levels, we project growth in the Euro Area that is well below one per cent over 
the next decade. In this sense, despite the intense focus on debt levels, the Euro 
Area is facing a growth crisis as much as it is facing a debt crisis, with the latter 
perhaps more a symptom of the former. 
 
The Euro Area’s current ratio of public debt to GDP is high by modern historical 
standards at 95 per cent but many of its Member States are able to borrow at 
very low rates and the pricing of ESM-issued securities shows that there are few 
concerns about the solvency of the Euro Area as a whole. There is thus a strong 
economic case for a large investment programme aimed at reducing 
unemployment and raising the supply capacity of the economy, funded by the 
Euro Area as a whole. Given that public capital funding is usually the first item 
slashed when governments cut back on spending in a crisis, it is likely that many 
of the projects funded by such an initiative involve spending that will need to be 
undertaken at some time in the future anyway so a programme of this sort may 
have limited long-run effects on debt levels. Unfortunately, Europe’s political 
constraints are likely to rule out such a programme for the foreseeable future. 
 
Over the longer-term, Europe needs a plan for dealing with a pattern of 
population ageing that is set to have enormous effects. Policy initiatives to delay 
retirement ages and to encourage labour force participation are undoubtedly 
part of the solution to the problems posed by ageing. However, these initiatives 
are likely to be very unpopular politically and may have negative implications for 
productivity. A policy of large planned increases in the amount of immigration 
into the EU, while also politically challenging, may turn out to be the only way to 
keep the European economy expanding in the future.   
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TABLE 1  Decomposition of Euro Area and US Output Growth Rates (%) 
 Euro Area United States 
Period Δy Δa Δk Δl Δy Δa Δk Δl 
1970-1976 3.6 2.7 1.5 -0.5 3.1 0.9 1.2 1.0 
1977-1986 2.1 1.6 0.8 -0.4 3.1 0.7 1.2 1.2 
1987-1996 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.0 2.9 0.9 1.1 0.9 
1997-2006 2.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 3.1 0.9 1.6 0.7 
2007-2013 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.6 1.0 0.5 0.7 -0.2 
         
2000-2013 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.0 1.7 0.5 1.1 0.2 
2010-2013 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.5 2.1 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Source:  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan. Demographics and the Growth Outlook for Europe. ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
Notes:  The table shows the contribution of growth in labour inputs, capital inputs and TFP to total output growth, where Δa 
 denotes change in TFP; Δk denotes change in capital inputs; Δl denotes change in labour inputs and Δy denotes change in  total 
output growth. 
 
TABLE 2  Decomposition of Growth in Hours Worked (%) 
 Euro Area 
Period Total Pop. P. Rate Emp. Rate Work Week 
1970-1976 -0.8 0.5 0.0 -0.4 -1.0 
1977-1986 -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.5 -0.8 
1987-1996 0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.4 
1997-2006 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 -0.4 
2007-2013 -0.9 0.3 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 
      
2000-2013 0.0 0.5 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 
2010-2013 -0.8 0.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.3 
      
 United States 
Period Total Pop. P. Rate Emp. Rate Work Week 
1970-1976 1.5 1.0 1.5 -0.5 -0.5 
1977-1986 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.0 -0.1 
1987-1996 1.3 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 
1997-2006 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 
2007-2013 -0.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 
      
2000-2013 0.2 0.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
2010-2013 1.4 0.7 -0.4 0.8 0.2 
Source:  McQuinn, K. and K. Whelan. Demographics and the Growth Outlook for Europe. ESRI Working Paper, forthcoming. 
Notes:  Pop. refers to changes in population, P. denotes participation; EMP. denotes employment; and Work Week refers to change 
 in average work week hours. 
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FIGURE 1 Determinants of Euro Area Hours Growth: 1970-2013  
 
Source:  AMECO. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 Euro Area Demographic Changes 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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FIGURE 3 Labour Market Assumptions 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
 
FIGURE 4 Labour Supply 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
 
FIGURE 5 Investment and TFP Assumptions 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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FIGURE 6 Output Growth Rates 
 
Source:  AMECO + own estimates. 
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